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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968 to reduce flood
damages nationwide and ease the Federal government’s financial burden for providing disaster
recovery. Today, approximately 22,000 communities in all 50 states and U.S. territories participate
in the NFIP. The program has 5.1 million flood insurance policies providing $1.3 trillion in
coverage. Due largely to recent flood disasters, the NFIP is over $20.5 billion in debt.
A proportionally small number of properties insured through the program are repeatedly
flooded, repaired, and rebuilt. These properties, known as “severe repetitive loss” (SRL)
properties, contribute disproportionally to the rising debts of the NFIP program. SRL properties
represent just 0.6 percent of the roughly 5.1 million properties insured through the NFIP, but they
account for 9.6 percent of all damages paid, as of 2015. Climate change impacts, including sea level
rise, more intense and frequent precipitation events, and increased storm surge, put these already
vulnerable properties at even greater risk and will greatly increase the number of properties
caught in this cycle of “flood-rebuild-repeat.”
The NFIP contains an adaptive mechanism—the substantial improvement/damage
(“SI/SD”) standard—which can break the cycle of “flood-rebuild-repeat.”

To join the NFIP,

communities must adopt and enforce a uniform set of floodplain regulations, which include the
SI/SD standard. The SI/SD standard requires property owners making significant improvements or
repairs to structures in areas most vulnerable to flooding to take certain measures to mitigate their
risk. These measures include requirements to elevate, relocate, or demolish a residential structure.
Non-residential structures may be floodproofed. However, two critical shortcomings of the current
FEMA SI/SD definition undermine the effectiveness of program: 1) the SI/SD standard is only
triggered when damages or repair work are equal to or exceed 50 percent of the fair market value
of the structure, and 2) the regulatory definitions of “substantial improvement” and “substantial
damage” do not consider repetitive cumulative repair work or cumulative damage over time.
A number of NFIP communities have undertaken more rigorous SI/SD standards as part of
the Community Rating System (CRS) Program which rewards communities which mitigate their
flood risk by reducing flood insurance premiums for their citizens. Our review of 2013 data from
FEMA, the most current that the agency could provide, revealed that among the 1,444
communities participating in the CRS program, roughly 1/3 receive points for taking some action
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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toward instituting a more rigorous cumulative or lower threshold SI or SD standard. More
specifically:


At least 309 communities received CRS credit for a cumulative SI or SD standard with at
least a 10-year tracking requirement.



At least 90 communities received CRS credit for a cumulative SI or SD standard with at
least a 5-year tracking requirement.



Collectively, these communities represent roughly a quarter of CRS communities (399/1444
or 27.6 percent), illustrating an opportunity for many more communities to follow suit.



Few communities utilize a threshold below 50 percent of market value for measuring
substantial damage or improvements. FEMA data identifies 25 communities receiving
credit for less than a 50 percent threshold and 32 communities receiving credit for a
regulatory threshold that is no more than 25 percent of the square footage of a building’s
lowest floor.
Reforming the SI/SD standard to calculate damages cumulatively over time and to be

triggered for damages and repair work worth less than 50 percent of the fair market value of the
structure can help the NFIP program better weather a changing climate, lessen the taxpayer
burden, and increase the safety of millions of homeowners. Through model flood ordinances,
building codes, other regulations, and guidance, states have several mechanisms to encourage or
require municipalities and counties to adopt these more protective standards. We propose model
ordinance language for state-level programs or direct adoption by communities that integrates
both cumulative and lower threshold definitions of substantial damage and improvement.
Communities will yield three primary benefits from adoption of such standards:
1. The proposed model ordinance should help communities better protect people and
property by bringing older housing stock into current floodplain management
requirements more expediently.
2. The proposed cumulative and lower threshold model ordinance is structured to satisfy
Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage requirements to ensure that NFIP
policyholders are eligible for financial assistance to bring their structure into compliance
after a flood.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School
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3. The proposed model ordinance is designed to maximize Community Rating System (CRS)
credit, which will help communities attain a higher CRS ranking, and thus, reduced
insurance costs for their residents.
Nevertheless, several challenges arise in effectively raising the SI/SD standard related to
tracking, financing, and equity. These challenges can be at least partially mitigated through: 1)
issuing disclosure laws that track expenditures for repairs and damages over time so that potential
buyers and new owners are aware of their property’s history, 2) pursuing novel financing and
insurance strategies that could reduce the administrative and monetary burden of implementing
the proposed SI/SD standard, and 3) integrating equity and underlying social vulnerability
considerations into a reform package and providing adequate financing and other support.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

iii

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF “FLOOD-REBUILD-REPEAT”

CONTENTS
1.

The National Flood Insurance Program and Climate Change………………………………… 1

1.1

Rising Costs of the NFIP Program………………………………………………………………….. 2

1.2

Climate Risks Will Further Burden the NFIP Program…………………………………………... 3

2.

Substantial Improvement/Damage Standard: A Tool for Reducing Flood Risk?................... 4

2.1
Options for Communities to Increase Climate Resilience: Cumulative Standards and Lower
Thresholds for Defining Substantial Damage……………………………………………………………… 6
2.2
Are States and Municipalities Integrating Stronger Substantial Improvement/Damage
Standards?........................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.1

Survey of State Model Flood Ordinances………………………………………………………….. 9

2.2.2 Nineteen States Use the Standard FEMA Definition for Substantial Damage or
Improvement………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
2.2.3 Twelve States Include Higher Standard for Substantial Damage or Improvement as
Optional, Alternative Definition…………………………………………………………………………….. 11
2.2.4 Eight States include Higher Substantial Standard for Substantial Damage or Improvement
as Primary Definition………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
3.

Policy Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………... 13

3.1
Cumulative and Lower Threshold Substantial Damage/Improvement Standard Model
Ordinance……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13
3.2

Potential Benefits of Adopting Such a Model Ordinance………………………………………... 14

3.2.1

Reduced Flood Risk………………………………………………………………………………….. 14

3.2.2

ICC Coverage…………………………………………………………………………………………. 15

3.2.3

CRS Credit…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17

3.3
Challenges of Adopting Such a Model Ordinance and Opportunities to Overcome them:
Mechanisms to Assist Communities Faced with Financial and Social Costs of Rebuilding………….. 18
3.3.1 Disclosure Laws to Track Cumulative Improvements & Damages Running with the
Property………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 18
3.3.2

Financing Challenges & Solutions………………………………………………………………….. 18

3.3.3

Equity Concerns……………………………………………………………………………………… 20

4.

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………. 22

5.

Annex…………………………………………………………………………………………………..23

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

iv

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF “FLOOD-REBUILD-REPEAT”

1. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM AND CLIMATE
CHANGE
Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968 to reduce flood
damages nationwide and ease the Federal government’s financial burden for providing disaster
recovery.1 Prior to the creation of the NFIP, the absence of widely available private flood insurance
had left the federal government, and consequently taxpayers, with escalating costs to provide
disaster relief for the uninsured. At the time, the government’s primary strategy was to invest in
flood control works like dams, levees, and seawalls, but these public works did not discourage
unwise development in the floodplain—in fact, they may have encouraged it. The creation of the
NFIP addressed these problems by providing federally backed flood insurance protection for
property owners and for renters, but tying access to this insurance to the creation of communityenforced building and zoning ordinances that would reduce risky development and flood-related
damage to homes.
The NFIP is structured as a partnership between the federal government, states,
communities, and insurers. To join the NFIP, communities adopt and enforce policies for smarter
floodplain development that meet minimum standards set by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the agency responsible for administering the program. These policies include
building and zoning code requirements and adoption of Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs),
maps created by FEMA to designate the level of flood hazard across an area. These maps include
Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) which are areas in the 100-year flood plain—meaning they
have a 1-percent chance of a flood occurring in a given year. NFIP’s minimum standards primarily
regulate development in the SFHA and ensure properties in the SFHA obtain flood insurance if
they have a federally backed mortgage or a mortgage from a federally regulated institution. Once a
community enters the program, federally backed flood insurance becomes available for homes and
small businesses in that area. While insurers write the policies and process claims on behalf of
NFIP, they are only intermediaries; the federal government sets prices and bears the risk.

National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42
U.S.C.A. § 4001 et. Seq. It was further modified by the National Flood Insurance Reform Act (NFIRA) of 1994
1
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1.1

Rising Costs of the NFIP Program
Today, the NFIP has 5.1 million flood insurance policies providing $1.3 trillion of insurance

coverage to policyholders in more than 22,000 communities spanning all 50 states and other U.S.
territories.2 Over its lifetime, the NFIP has provided more than $68 billion to help policyholders
rebuild their homes in the aftermath of inland floods and coastal storms.3 After the staggering
losses from the 2017 hurricane season, Congress canceled $16 billion of debt accrued by NFIP. 4
Even so, as of July 2018, the NFIP remained $20.5 billion in debt because it collects too little in
insurance premiums from policyholders to cover the damages it must pay out. 5 This debt
continues to escalate, due at least in part to recent storms causing catastrophic flooding. Between
2005 and July 2018, nine storms caused losses in excess of $500 million each.6
A proportionally small number of properties that are repeatedly repaired and rebuilt in
areas vulnerable to flooding, called “severe repetitive loss” (SRL) properties, contribute to the
rising debts of the program. The NFIP paid $5.5 billion to repair and rebuild more than 30,000 SRL
properties between 1978 and 2015.7 These SRL properties constitute only 0.6 percent of the 5.1
million properties insured through the NFIP, but have consumed a disproportionate 9.6 percent of
all damages paid out of the NFIP as of 2015.8 As discussed below, climate change puts these
already vulnerable properties at even greater risk and current NFIP policies do not adequately
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (hereinafter FEMA), Policy Statistics Country-Wide,
https://perma.cc/3NR6-RSZF (last updated September 2018). Roughly 20 percent of the nation-wide policy
base is subsidized. Holders of these policies pay premiums that are 40 to 45 percent of their true risk rate. See
Government Accountability Office (hereinafter GAO), GAO-13-607, Flood Insurance: More Information Needed
on Subsidized Properties 6 (July 2013).
3 FEMA, NFIP Loss Statistics, https://perma.cc/KV55-V7TW (last updated Sept. 2018).
4 Cong. Research Service, R45242, Private Flood Insurance and the National Flood Insurance Program 1 (July 2018)
(stating Congress canceled $16 billion of NFIP debt to allow the program to pay claims).
5 Diane Horn, Cong. Research Service, IN10784, CRS Insight: National Flood Insurance Program Borrowing
Authority 5 (April 2018) (showing the National Flood Insurance had accrued $20.5 billion in debt). See also,
GAO, GAO-17-425, Flood Insurance: Comprehensive Reform Could Improve Solvency and Enhance Resilience 1
(April 2017) (stating the debt level in March 2017, before Hurricanes Harvey, Maria, and Irma, stood at $24.6
billion due and collection of premiums would likely be insufficient to repay the debt), available at
https://perma.cc/F6FL-3GXL.
6 FEMA, Significant Flood Events, https://perma.cc/7N99-FFX5 (last updated as of July 31, 2018).
7 Robert Moore, NRDC IB: 17-07-A, Seeking Higher Ground: How to Break the Cycle of Repeated Flooding with
Climate-Smart Flood Insurance Reforms, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 2 (July 2017),
https://perma.cc/Q66X-D4HE.
8 Id.
2
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ensure property owners rebuild in a manner to lessen their vulnerability to flooding or incentivize
property owners to relocate to areas with a lower risk of flooding.

1.2

Climate Risks Will Further Burden the NFIP Program
Climate change is exacerbating flood risk through a combination of factors that combine

synergistically, including heavier precipitation events, sea level rise, and greater storm surge. The
U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program (USGCCRP), the body designated by Congress to
determine the state of climate science to inform federal policy, finds that heavy precipitation
events have increased in both intensity and frequency in most parts of the United States.9 In their
most recent assessment, the USGCCRP concludes that global average sea levels will rise by 1-4 feet
by 2100 and that a rise of as much as 8 feet by 2100 is possible.10 Further, sea level rise along the
East and Gulf Coasts of the United States will exceed the global average. Rising sea-level has
already increased the number of tidal floods each year that cause minor impacts (also called
“nuisance floods”) by 5- to 10-fold since the 1960s in several U.S. coastal cities, and this trend is
already accelerating in over 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities.11
Climate change is driving up the already escalating costs of maintaining the NFIP by
expanding the floodplain—and thus the number of people within the SFHA needing coverage—
and by driving up the average loss cost per policy. A FEMA sponsored study conducted by
AECOM estimates the SFHA will grow by between 40-45 percent by 2100 depending on whether
coastal recession is assumed or not.12 Under the assumption of a fixed shoreline, AECOM projects
that the total number of NFIP policies may increase by approximately 100 percent by 2100 due to
the combination of population growth and a larger SFHA due to climate change.13 Under this
scenario, the average loss cost per policy may increase approximately 90 percent by the year 2100
Wuebbles, D.J., et al., 2017: Executive Summary, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I 20 (Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart,
and T.K. Maycock eds., U.S. Global Change Research Program ), https://perma.cc/9GYV-ZKDV.
10 Id. at 25-26.
11 Id. at 27.
12 AECOM, The Impact of Climate Change and Population Growth on the National Flood Insurance Program through
2100 ES-7 (2013), https://perma.cc/5RVD-A4VQ. Coastal recession assumes the shoreline retreats inland,
which could serve to reduce the size of the floodplain.
13Id.
9
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and the average premium per policy would need to increase as much as 70 percent in today’s U.S.
dollars by the year 2100 in order to offset the projected increase in loss cost.14
Sea level rise will further exacerbate the cycle of “flood-rebuild-repeat” plaguing the NFIP.
NRDC estimates that 3 feet of sea level rise by 2100 could result in an additional 820,000 severe
repetitive loss (SRL) properties and 6 feet of SLR would result in 2.57 million more SRL
properties.15 This study estimates that 650,000-2.03 million of these SRL properties would sustain
damage crossing the “substantial damage” fifty-percent threshold. 16 This means hundreds of
thousands of properties could be repeatedly rebuilt through the NFIP without needing to enhance
their resilience, driving the program further into debt and endangering residents. However, NFIP
can improve its tools to incentivize claimholders to rebuild resiliently rather than setting them up
for future losses.

2. SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT/DAMAGE STANDARD: A TOOL
FOR REDUCING FLOOD RISK?
When buildings in the SFHA undergo repair or improvement, it creates an opportunity to
increase resilience and reduce the vulnerability of individual structures, their inhabitants, and
entire

communities

to

future

flooding

events.

The

NFIP

includes

a

substantial

improvement/damage (“SI/SD”) standard which requires property owners making significant
repairs or rebuilding structures in the SFHA to take certain measures to bring their structure into
compliance with the community’s current floodplain management requirements, such as elevating
the home above the base flood elevation level, to reduce their exposure to future flood damages.17
“Substantial damage” is defined by FEMA as damage of any origin sustained by a structure
for which the cost of repairing the structure would equal or exceed 50 percent of the market value
Id. at ES-8.
Moore, supra note 7, at 12.
16 Id.; infra Part 2.
17 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a-c)(providing regulatory requirements for to new construction and substantial
improvement under the NFIP program); see also FEMA, FEMA P-578, Substantial Improvement/Substantial Desk
Reference (2010), https://perma.cc/UHK8-GXBZ; FEMA, R4 DR-4338-GA FS 008 9, Fact Sheet: NFIP “Substantial
Damage” – What Does It Mean? (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/2B69-F4DU (offering alternative options to
elevating a structure, including demolishing or relocation of a residential structure or floodproofing a nonresidential structure).
14
15
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of the structure before the damage occurred.18 The “substantial improvement” standard similarly
applies for renovation or improvement work to a structure.19 When the costs of an improvement or
repair of damage to a structure surpass this threshold, the structure must be brought into
compliance with current community floodplain management requirements. For example, if a
home, located in the SFHA (1 percent annual chance floodplain), was built before the community
joined the NFIP and it was damaged by 50 percent of its pre-damage market value, the home
would most likely have to be elevated to, at a minimum, the base flood elevation. The SI/SD
standard requirement ensures older structures are brought into compliance with modern building
requirements for flood risk, thereby, reducing the vulnerability of those structures to future flood
events.
The SI/SD requirement provides a critical lever to enhance resilience to climate change and
break the cycle of sinking taxpayer dollars into repeatedly rebuilding and repairing the same
vulnerable structures. It creates an opportunity to make communities stronger, safer, and smarter
while reducing future damage costs. However, in practice it has several limitations. First, the
prevalence of SRL properties demonstrates buildings are repeatedly damaged by flooding events
below the 50 percent threshold and rebuilt. Since the standard is not cumulative, meaning it
requires a one-time event that surpasses the 50 percent to trigger compliance, it does not sum up
these repeated repairs and potentially creates a perverse incentive to do multiple repairs over time
to avoid exceeding the threshold with any single repair. Second, it fails to incentivize increasing
resilience to flooding of buildings that are heavily damaged, but below the 50 percent damage
threshold. For example, a lower threshold of 25 percent damage would more rapidly bring the
existing housing stock up to code, decreasing vulnerability for future floods. Third, it creates an
incentive to lowball damage estimates to help residents avoid the high costs of bringing structures
into compliance with flood ordinances. An investigation by the Houston Chronicle indicates the

See 44 C.F.R. 59.1 (defining substantial damage as “damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby
the cost of restoring the structure to its before damaged condition would equal or exceed 50 percent of the
market value of the structure before the damage occurred”).
19 Id. (defining “substantial improvement” to apply for “any reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or other
improvement of a structure” for which the estimated cost equals or exceeds 50 percent of the market value of
the structure would equal prior to “start of construction” of the improvement).
18
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intentional lowballing of damage estimates is pervasive nationwide. 20 The Chronicle examined
claims records for more than 36,000 SRL properties, and found about 16 percent had “evidence of
being substantially damaged—beyond the 50 percent threshold—at least once before flooding
again.” 21 Lax enforcement of the substantial damage standard and its correlation to repeated
flooding has been recognized for more than twenty years as a major shortcoming of the NFIP.22

2.1

Options for Communities to Increase Climate Resilience: Cumulative
Standards and Lower Thresholds for Defining Substantial Damage
The NFIP provides a mechanism to incentivize communities to take on more rigorous

SI/SD standards to ensure better flood protection. Communities with stronger flood protection
regulations than those mandated by the NFIP can join the NFIP’s Community Rating System (CRS)
and receive a discount on flood insurance premiums for their residents. Communities receive
credit points for the different activities they take to reduce flood losses. Based on their score
classification, communities can receive up to 45 percent off flood insurance premiums for residents
in their communities. 23 As of 2017, nearly 3.6 million policyholders in 1,444 communities
participated in the CRS.24 Of the over 22,000 communities participating in the NFIP, only 5 percent
participate in the CRS program, but more than 69 percent of all flood insurance policies are written
in CRS communities.25
The CRS program principally rewards higher regulatory standards for floodplain
development, including two reforms for stronger SI/SD standards:

Mark Collette, Flood Games: Manipulation of Flood Insurance Leads to Repeat Disasters, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(JULY 5, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/84YV-CETU.
21 Id.
22 David Conrad, Ben McNitt, and Martha Stout, Higher Ground: A Report on Voluntary Property Buyouts in the
Nation’s Floodplains, A Common Ground Solution Serving People at Risk, Taxpayers, and the Environment,
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION (July 1998) available at https://perma.cc/3AMV-EQ35 (stating “that large
numbers of substantially damaged properties have apparently not been elevated or removed as required,
and substantial damage requirements have often not been enforced in many communities.”)
23 FEMA, CRS Credit for Higher Regulatory Standards 1 (2006), https://perma.cc/EM77-YAHT.
24FEMA, Community Rating System Fact Sheet (June 2017), https://perma.cc/DW5Q-VNMH.
25 Id.
20
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Cumulative Substantial Improvement/Damage Standard


The first option is a “cumulative substantial improvement” (CSI) standard under which all
improvements or repairs during a certain period of time are counted cumulatively toward
the substantial improvement requirement. This prevents owners from undertaking many
small repairs over time that eventually would add up to a larger repair. For example, this
standard may count all repairs from major flood events over a ten-year period
cumulatively toward a fifty-percent threshold of substantial damage. The CRS program
allocates points according to the type of cumulative standard. See the Annex for a
breakdown of how CRS points are awarded for this standard and suggested FEMA draft
text for a point-earning CSI standard.

Lower Substantial Improvement/Damage Threshold


The second option is a “lower substantial improvement” (LSI) standard which uses a
threshold lower than 50 percent of the building’s value to determine when the substantial
improvement requirement takes effect. For example, it might trigger requirements to
elevate or make buildings more flood resilient if a flood causes damages that equal or are
greater than 25 percent of the pre-damage market value. The CRS program allocates points
according to the damage threshold established. See the Annex for a breakdown of how CRS
points are awarded for this standard and suggested FEMA draft text for a point-earning
LSI standard.

2.2

Are States and Municipalities Integrating Stronger Substantial
Improvement/Damage Standards?
Among the 1,444 communities participating in the CRS program, roughly 1/3 receive points

for taking some action toward instituting a more rigorous cumulative or lower threshold SI or SD
standard.

26

Among these communities, ISO Community Hazard Mitigation, the consulting

FEMA, 2007 & 2013 CSI and LSI Communities Data, Emails received from David Arkens, ISO/CRS
Technical Coordinator at ISO Community Hazard Mitigation, to Joel Scata, Attorney, Natural Res. Def.
Council (between June 2018-October 2018)(on file with authors)(hereafter referred to as “FEMA CSI and LSI
Data”). These datasheets were obtained via email from David Arkens, ISO/CRS Technical Coordinator at ISO
26

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

7

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF “FLOOD-REBUILD-REPEAT”

company employed to manage the NFIP dataset, identifies at least 309 communities receiving CSI
credit for a cumulative SI or SD standard with at least a 10-year tracking requirement and at least
90 communities receiving credit for at least a 5-year tracking requirement. 27 Collectively, these
communities represent more than a quarter of CRS communities (399/1444 or 27.6 percent), but
would only represent less than 2 percent of communities participating in the NFIP program.28
Even fewer communities utilize a threshold below 50 percent of market value for measuring
substantial damage or improvements. FEMA data identifies 25 communities receiving credit for
LSI1, which requires a less than a 50 percent threshold, and 32 communities receiving credit for
LSI2, with a regulatory threshold that is no more than 25 percent of the square footage of the
building’s lowest floor.29

Community Hazard Mitigation, on Aug. 20, 2018. This data is the most recent from FEMA based on their
2007 and 2013 manuals listing all CRS communities that received points toward CSI or LSI standards for
those years. The datasheets showed 522/1433 communities received points.
27 ISO CRS SI/SD Standards Data, Emails received from David Arkens, ISO/CRS Technical Coordinator at
ISO Community Hazard Mitigation, to Joel Scata, Attorney, Natural Res. Def. Council (between June 2018October 2018)(on file with authors) (hereafter “ISO CRS SI/SD Standards Data”). ISO Community Hazard
Mitigation maintains CRS data for FEMA and these estimates are based on their most current spreadsheets
which are based on data from the 2007 and 2013 FEMA manuals, but with a further level of detail than the
“FEMA CSI and LSI Data” sheets that he was able to provide to us. David Arkens reported 134 communities
with a 10-year Cumulative Substantial Improvement requirement, 121 communities with a 10-year
Cumulative Substantial Damage requirement from their 2013 data, and an additional 175 communities with
a 10-year Cumulative Substantial Improvement or Damage requirement from the 2007 data. David
confirmed the 2007 communities did not overlap with the 2013 communities. To estimate communities with
a 10-year cumulative tracking requirement, we combined the 134 “2013 communities” with an SI standard
with the 175 “2007 communities.” This may result in a lower estimate of communities because some
additional 2013 communities may have an SD standard without an SI standard, but as SI is frequently
defined to include SD, this approach avoids a high-level of potential overlap between the 2013 SI and SD
communities. The same approach was used for calculating communities with a 5-year cumulative standard.
The data received on communities with a 5-year standard was 80 communities with a 5-year CSI
Improvement requirement in the 2013 manual, 66 communities with a 5-year CSI Damage requirement in the
2013 manual, and 10 communities with a 5-year CSI Improvement or Damage requirement in the 2007
manual.
28 While additional non-CRS communities have adopted cumulative standards, there is no record-keeping to
track what percentage of these communities have adopted higher standards. We assume that adoption of
cumulative standards would be much less frequent in non-CRS communities than CRS communities.
However, a floodplain manager from Illinois reports that there are many non-CRS communities in Illinois
who have adopted the cumulative standard. See, E-mail from Paul Osman, Chief, Statewide Floodplain
Programs, Illinois Office of Water Res., to Joel Scata, Attorney, Natural Res. Def. Council (Dec. 10, 2018, 1:39
CST)(on file with the authors).
29 Id.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

8

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF “FLOOD-REBUILD-REPEAT”

CRS Communities with a Cumulative SD and/or SI Standard (2007 and 2013 Data)30
Standard
Number of Communities
Percent of CRS Communities
Receiving CRS Credit for
Receiving CRS Credit for
Standard
Standard
10-Year Tracking
309
21.4%
Requirement
5-Year Tracking
90
6.2%
Requirement
Total
399
27.6%
2.2.1 Survey of State Model Flood Ordinances
The low penetration of communities with higher SI/SD standards in the NFIP program
indicates an opportunity to increase the resilience of communities to flooding and the adaptability
of the NFIP program through wider adoption. While communities must individually choose to
adopt higher standards, states can help promote greater adoption of more stringent standards
through a variety of mechanisms. Many states have model flood ordinances which communities
can adopt.31 Several states have multiple ordinances which are tailored to meet the respective
needs of communities with different zones from the flood maps. 32 Others distinguish between
riverine or coastal communities.33 Some states have separate ordinances with higher standards for
CRS communities.34 In addition to model ordinances, states may also provide regulatory language
for substantial improvement and damage standards through building codes, other flood
regulations, quick guides, desk references, or strategic plans.
We surveyed state model flood ordinances and related documents to assess how frequently
these documents endorse standard NFIP requirements for substantial damage and improvement

ISO CRS SI/SD Standards Data, supra note 27.
State-level model ordinances are dependent on municipal level authorities to adopt the relevant standards.
In certain states, legal authority to adopt these standards must be delegated to municipalities. Municipalities
and counties should carefully review their local authorities before adopting any standards.
32 See e.g., Delaware Flood Ordinance Revision Resources, https://perma.cc/9R6N-KBNB, (last accessed Oct.
16, 2018).
33 See e.g., Alabama Department of Economic and Community Affairs, Office of Water Resources, Floodplain
Management, “NFIP Community Participation Resources,” available at https://perma.cc/MS9R-FFC4 (last
accessed Oct. 16, 2018)(linking to respective model flood ordinances for coastal and riverine communities).
34 See e.g., Idaho’s Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance – Idaho Model Ordinance for CRS communities.
Information obtained via email from Maureen O’Shea, State NFIP Coordinator, Idaho Dept. of Water
Resources on Sept. 19, 2018 (on file with authors).
30
31
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versus how frequently they provide models for a higher standard. Of fifty states surveyed, we
were able to obtain and review ordinances or other regulations containing SI/SD standards for
thirty-nine states.35 Roughly half of these ordinances provided only the standard FEMA definition
for substantial damage. Another twelve provided the standard FEMA definition, but also
suggested optional text for more stringent requirements in at least one of their ordinances. It is
worth noting that additional states outline options for more protective requirements in instruction
documents or guidance associated with their ordinances. Only eight states utilize a more stringent
definition of substantial damage or improvement as the default text of their ordinances, rather
than optional, additional text. This section provides further detail on these trends.
SI/SD Standards in State Model Flood Ordinances
Total States for Which Model Flood Ordinance 39
or Similar Document Reviewed*
Ordinances Using Standard FEMA Definition
19
of Substantial Damage/Substantial
Improvement
Ordinances with Optional Language for a
12
Cumulative Damage Standard
Ordinances with Optional Language for a
4
Lower Threshold Damage Standard
Ordinances with Primary Definition of SI or
8
SD as a Cumulative Standard
Ordinances with Primary Definition of SI or
0
SD as a Lower Threshold Standard
*The remaining eleven states either A) did not have a model flood ordinance or B) did not have
an ordinance publicly available online and officials did respond to requests to provide a copy of
the ordinances.

For states without ordinances available online, we contacted state agencies responsible for flood plain
management to obtain copies of any existing ordinances. In cases, where an ordinance was subsequently
provided, we included those in our dataset. Twelve states either did not have an ordinance or did not have
an ordinance available online and did not respond to our queries to provide a copy. Of the remaining thirtyeight states, we included a building code for Michigan and the Hawaii county ordinances which are places
those states use the FEMA definitions of substantial damage and improvement.
35
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2.2.2 Nineteen States Use the Standard FEMA Definition for Substantial Damage or
Improvement
Nineteen states use the standard FEMA definition for substantial damage, with no
additional optional language. Several of these states use the standard FEMA definition, but
encourage communities to adopt more stringent standards through other resources. For example,
Delaware provides an accompanying technical support document that encourages communities to
enhance the substantial damage definition.36

2.2.3 Twelve States Include Higher Standard for Substantial Damage or Improvement as
Optional, Alternative Definition
Twelve states include optional, alternative definitions for substantial damage or
improvement that are either cumulative or have a lower market value threshold for damages.
Some states only have optional text for certain flood zones. For example, of California’s three
model ordinances, two of them (coastal and non-coastal zones) include cumulative and lowerthreshold optional text in the definition, while the third ordinance (which covers areas without
FEMA-identified special flood hazard zones) uses the standard FEMA definition alone.37 Of these
twelve states, all included cumulative standards as an option in at least one ordinance, and four
additionally noted the option of lowering the damage threshold below 50 percent of market
value.38

2.2.4 Eight States include Higher Substantial Standard for Substantial Damage or
Improvement as Primary Definition
Only a handful of states—Alabama, Mississippi, West Virginia, Hawaii, Illinois, and
Vermont—were found to directly include stronger standards as part of their primary definitions of
substantial damage in a flood ordinance. Illinois, Georgia, and Kentucky have cumulative
language in their primary definitions of substantial improvement. Illinois and Kentucky further
include “repetitive loss” structures in their definitions of “substantial damage” to create a

Delaware Flood Ordinance Revision Resources, https://perma.cc/L58V-SYTE, (last accessed Oct. 16, 2018).
California NFIP Community Resources, https://perma.cc/J2CT-QADV, (last accessed Oct. 16, 2018).
38 The four states which included optional language for a lower damage threshold were NE, NC, NJ, and ID.
36
37
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cumulative SD standard. These primary definitions all concern cumulative standards rather than
lowered thresholds which may be best explained by the fact that a cumulative standard often
counts “repetitive loss” properties which is a requirement for communities seeking FEMA funding
to bring their structures up to code. 39 However, these states can also add lower threshold in
additional, optional text. For example, Alabama’s model ordinance for riverine communities has a
note that a lower threshold could be adopted.40
States with a model flood ordinance that includes a cumulative standard as the primary
definition of substantial damage show a high percentage of CRS communities adopting that higher
standard. This suggests that among communities seeking to undertake more robust flood
management, the presence of ordinance language can encourage communities to shift their
requirements for substantial damage. For example, among states with cumulative definitions, over
90 percent (15/16) of CRS communities in Alabama, 100 percent (32/32) of CRS communities in
Mississippi, 100 percent (62/62) of CRS communities in Illinois, 60 percent (6/10) of CRS
communities in West Virginia, and 83 percent (44/53) of CRS communities in Georgia have
included cumulative substantial damage language in their floodplain ordinances.41 These rates are
all significantly higher than the national average of 1/3 of CRS communities receiving some level of
credit for cumulative standards.42 However, it is certainly not a guarantee, as there is low adoption
of cumulative language among CRS communities in Hawaii, Vermont, and Kentucky.

43

Additionally, the work of state agencies through model ordinances, guidance documents, or
informal conversation to increase community awareness of these standards can play an important
role in community adoption.

See infra Part 3.2.2 “ICC Coverage” for more information.
Alabama Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance (Riverine), 2018, https://perma.cc/ZMK9-U9QT (last
accessed Oct. 16, 2018).
41 FEMA CSI and LSI Data, see supra note 26.
42 Id.
43 Id.
39
40
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3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Floodplain management standards that exceed the NFIP minimum requirements better
protect a community’s citizens and property. As noted above, some states recommend and some
communities have adopted such higher requirements for Substantial Improvement/Substantial
Damage (SI/SD).44 Given “the vast majority of flood damages to structures amount to less than 50
percent of the value of the structure,” 45 imposing a more stringent SI/SD standard can help
communities break the cycle of flood-rebuild-repeat.46 The following definitions for substantial
damage and substantial improvement can be adopted directly by communities or be assimilated
by states as part of a model ordinance, building code, or other regulation. By adopting these higher
standards, communities can reduce their residents’ flood risk, lower residents’ flood insurance
premiums, and enable residents to secure federal funds for rebuilding more resiliently after flood
damage. The 40 percent threshold is meant as an example and could be adjusted based on the
needs of the community. The recommended cumulative definition for substantial damage is based
on the definition of an NFIP repetitive loss structure and ensuring access funding from FEMA to
offset costs of compliance as further discussed in Part 3.2.2.

3.1 Cumulative and Lower Threshold Substantial Damage/Improvement
Standard Model Ordinance
Substantial Damage
Substantial damage means damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby the cost of restoring the
structure to its before damaged condition would equal or exceed 40 percent market value of the structure
before damage occurred.47 Substantial damage also means flood related damage sustained by a structure on
two (2) separate occasions during a 10-year period for which the costs of repairs at the time of each such flood

The two approaches that exceed the NFIP minimum requirements for Substantial
Improvement/Substantial Damage are either a cumulative approach or a lower threshold approach.
45 ASFPM Floodplain Regulations Committee, A Guide for Higher Standards in Floodplain Management 8-9
(March 2013), https://perma.cc/565M-WPDE.
46 See Moore, supra note 7 (Analyzing how 30,000 properties, built before the requirements of higher flood
protection standards, repeatedly flood).
47 44 C.F.R 59.1.
44
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event, on average, equals or exceeds 25 percent of the market value of the structure before the damage
occurred.

Substantial Improvement
Substantial improvement means any combination of repairs, reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or other
improvement, the cost of which equals or exceeds 40 percent of the market value of the structure before the
‘start of construction,’ taking place during a [10+ year time period]. This term includes structures that have
incurred ‘substantial damage,’ regardless of the actual repair work performed.

3.2 Potential Benefits of Adopting Such a Model Ordinance
The above SI/SD model ordinance language addresses the shortcomings of the traditional
approach by 1) cumulatively assessing damage to a structure over time, and 2) lowering the
threshold for damage triggering the requirement. This approach has three major benefits. First, the
proposed model ordinance should help communities better protect people and property by
bringing older housing stock into current floodplain management requirements more expediently.
Second, the proposed cumulative and lower threshold model ordinance is structured to satisfy
Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage requirements to ensure that NFIP policyholders are
eligible for assistance to bring their structure into compliance after a flood. Third, the proposed
model ordinance is designed to maximize Community Rating System (CRS) credit, which will help
communities attain a higher CRS ranking, and thus, reduced insurance costs for their residents.

3.2.1 Reduced Flood Risk
As discussed earlier in this paper, the minimum NFIP requirement for the SI/SD standard is
dependent on a one-time event (damage or improvement) that equals or exceeds 50 percent of the
structure’s value in cost. Such a one-time event threshold can provide a perverse incentive to either
limit improvements or under-appraise damage to a structure so as not to reach the 50 percent
compliance trigger. Additionally, as noted by the Association of State Floodplain Managers, the
majority of flood events do not reach the SI/SD standard threshold, which means a flooded home
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will likely only be rebuilt to its pre-flood condition, which perpetuates a cycle of flooding and
rebuilding.48
Combining a cumulative approach and a lower threshold approach ensures that the trigger
for bringing a structure into compliance with a community’s floodplain management standards is
tripped more quickly, which will become increasingly imperative as climate change exacerbates
the risk of flooding. As noted above, an AECOM report prepared for FEMA projects the nation’s 1
percent annual chance floodplains will expand, on average, by 45 percent to 55 percent by 2100.49
As the floodplains expand, housing stock not previously subjected to a community’s floodplain
management criteria will become increasingly vulnerable.
Further, a cumulative approach deters intentional lowballing damage estimates to avoid
triggering the requirement that structures be brought into compliance with flood ordinances.
Counting improvements and damages over a period of 10 years greatly diminishes the potential to
avoid compliance by underestimating damage from a single event.

3.2.2 ICC Coverage
ICC coverage can provide NFIP policyholders additional monetary assistance to rebuild
after a flood. If an NFIP policyholder experiences a qualifying flood event, ICC coverage may
provide up to $30,000 to help cover the cost of flood mitigation measures, like elevation of the
home.50
To be eligible for ICC coverage, a NFIP policyholder must suffer a flood loss, located in the
SFHA, and be declared “substantially damaged” or “repetitively damaged.” 51 To receive ICC
coverage for the latter, the community must adopt and uniformly enforce a repetitive loss
provision or a cumulative substantial damage provision in its floodplain management laws or
regulations.52 In the context of ICC eligibility, FEMA defines repetitive damage to a structure as “a
building covered by a contract for flood insurance that has incurred flood-related damages on two
ASFPM, supra note 45 at 8-9.
AECOM, supra note 12 at ES-7.
50 See FEMA, FEMA p-1080, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about
Increased Cost of Compliance Coverage 1 (Feb. 2017), https://perma.cc/6CKC-Y8W6.
51 Id. at 3.
52 Id.
48
49
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occasions during a 10- year period ending on the date of the event for which a second claim is
made, in which the cost of repairing the flood damage, on the average, equaled or exceeded 25
percent of the market value of the building at the time of each such flood event.” 53 This has
encouraged communities to adopt a cumulative standard.
While ICC coverage previously required flood-related damage to equal or exceed 50
percent of the market value for the structure, FEMA has authorized ICC coverage if a community
has adopted a lower threshold.54 FEMA made this authorization to comply with directions from
Congress under the National Flood Insurance Act of 2004 that FEMA broaden the definition of
substantial damage, in the context of ICC compliance, in order to uphold claims under more
stringent local requirements.55 It would be consistent with this objective for FEMA to also honor
ICC coverage claims for multiple flood damages that equal or exceed a community’s repetitive
flood damage ordinance. We recommend that FEMA’s guidance should be interpreted to
encompass a combined lower threshold and cumulative standard, (e.g. 2 events over 10 years
causing damage past a 20% threshold), but localities should consult with their state floodplain
managers and FEMA officials to determine if ICC coverage would be awarded in that scenario.
The above model ordinance is designed to satisfy ICC coverage criteria for both substantial
and repetitive flood damage, while simultaneously providing a lower threshold to expedite the
transition of the older, more-flood prone housing stock. However, communities should be clear
ICC coverage is only provided if a homeowner has NFIP flood insurance and the damage to the
home is caused by flooding. All other damage and improvements to the structure that trigger the
SI/SD standard threshold will not be eligible for ICC coverage, and thus, the cost of compliance
will be borne by the homeowner.

Id.
FEMA, No. 01-2011, National Flood Insurance Program Policy Issuance 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/UP4UMHG2 (stating that ICC claims are authorized for a substantial damage threshold that has been adopted and
uniformly enforced by the community that may be lower than 50 percent).
55 S2238, the Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, Title I, Sec. 105(b)(4)
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. §4011(b)) as amended.
53
54
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3.2.3 CRS Credit
The proposed model ordinance is designed to maximize Community Rating System (CRS)
credit. The NFIP established the Community Rating System to encourage communities to adopt
floodplain management ordinances that exceed the NFIP minimum requirements and are effective
at reducing flood damages and claims under the NFIP.56 In CRS participating communities, NFIP
policyholders may benefit from premium discounts ranging from 5 to 45 percent depending on the
community’s CRS classification. 57 A community’s CRS classification is a ranking based on the
credit points for specific floodplain management activities, including higher regulatory standards.
The higher the accumulated credit points a community attains, the better CRS ranking they will
receive. For example, a community with 1,000 points will be ranked as a CRS Class 8, which will
provide its citizens with NFIP policies located within the SFHA at a 10 percent premium
discount.58 As the average NFIP policy premium costs roughly $1,000, policyholders in a CRS Class
8 community would save $100 per year.59 The above model ordinance, if adopted, could provide a
community up to 110 CRS credits, 90 points for counting substantial damage and improvement
cumulatively and 20 points for a SI/SD threshold below 50 percent.60

FEMA, Substantial Improvement/Substantial Desk Reference, supra note 17 at 5-17.
Id.
58 FEMA, FIA-15/2017, National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System Coordinator’s Manual, 110-3
(2017), https://perma.cc/5FJH-VTAU.
59 Insurance Journal, Federal Flood Insurance Average Premium to Rise 8% (April 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/5HJ8AGR2.
60 FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System Coordinator’s Manual, supra note 58 at
110-7 (2017) (A community may not receive a total of 110 points due to FEMA’s “impact adjustment”
formula, which adjusts CRS credit for the portion of the regulatory floodplain to which the “creditable
element is applied”).
56
57
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3.3

Challenges of Adopting Such a Model Ordinance and Opportunities
to Overcome Them: Mechanisms to Assist Communities Faced with
Financial and Social Costs of Rebuilding

3.3.1 Disclosure Laws to Track Cumulative Improvements & Damages Running with the
Property
While the proposed model ordinance will help communities better protect their citizens
and property, each community should consider all the implications of imposing a higher
regulatory standard than that of the NFIP minimum SI/SD standard. For instance, a cumulative
tracking of SI/SD carries with the property. Therefore, an unsuspecting home buyer may purchase
a property that is close to the threshold, and then due to a small improvement or repair may cross
that threshold and be obligated to bring the entire structure into compliance with the community’s
floodplain management requirements. 61 As ICC coverage is only available for flood-related
damage that satisfies FEMA’s repeatedly flooded damage requirements, the new home owner
could be burdened by a substantial expense.
States and communities could mitigate this situation by adopting a local real estate
disclosure law that pertains specifically to cumulative improvement/tracking. Such a disclosure
law would provide home buyers the necessary information to make a more informed decision
about purchasing in the 100-year floodplain, and better understand the risks and costs associated
with such a purchase.

3.3.2 Financing Challenges & Solutions
As the frequency and severity of climate impacts, like extreme precipitation events,
continue to rise, communities will increasingly face post-disaster situations in which numerous
properties have suffered damage sufficient to trigger the SI/SD standard threshold. Such situations
could encourage underestimating total damage to a property as ICC coverage is not always

Telephone Interview with Paul Osman, Chief, Statewide Floodplain Programs, Illinois Office of Water Res.
(Sept. 10, 2018) (Mr. Osman has experienced 3-4 cases where a home was sold with an accumulated 40 to 49
percent improvement and damage costs, and the buyer was unaware until they triggered the provision due
to a small scale project).
61
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sufficient to cover the cost of all required mitigation measures due to triggering of the SI/SD
standard.62 Innovative financing mechanisms, such as parametric insurance or resilience bonds,
may help cover the costs of bringing older structures into compliance.
Parametric insurance is a risk transfer arrangement that, unlike indemnity insurance, does
not indemnify one for the full loss caused by a disaster event.63 Instead, a purchaser of parametric
insurance buys a pre-defined amount of protection which pays out according to an agreed upon
triggering event.64 An example would be a parametric insurance policy that pays out $10 million if
a 0.2 percent annual chance flood occurs.
Parametric insurance can greatly increase the speed of payout and eliminate disputes over
the amount of the payout, a key benefit. Unlike indemnity insurance, parametric insurance policies
do not require a claims adjustment process.65 Rather, such policies pay out based on objective,
independently collected data.66 Like in the above example, a parametric policy insuring against
flood damage might set a threshold flood height required to trigger the policy, and then NOAA
data will be consulted to determine if the policy will be paid.
Regarding SI/SD standard compliance, a community could, theoretically, estimate the
number of older structures that would be substantially damaged by varying magnitudes of
flooding, and then work with a parametric insurance provider to structure a policy that could
cover the associated compliance costs. An added benefit of such an approach is that the faster
availability of funds that parametric insurance can provide “can be 3.5 times as effective as delayed
payments from aid” in improving the speed in which a community can recover post-disaster.67

Costs to raise a house are highly variable, but consistently estimated to be above the ICC cap. See e.g.,
Wharton Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes, Post-Flood Mitigation: The NFIP’s Increased Cost
of Compliance (ICC) Coverage 4 (Fall 2017), https://perma.cc/TF66-JH7Y (estimating that home elevation can
cost 3-5 times the ICC cap). See also, the HomeImprovement.net, “How Much Will It Cost to Raise Your
House?” (last visited Oct. 16, 2018) https://perma.cc/QC4H-83M4 (estimating the average cost to elevate a
home is between $30,000 and $100,000).
63 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, The Center for Insurance Policy and Research,
Parametric Disaster Insurance, https://perma.cc/L6EF-765S (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
64 Id. (Parametric insurance is not affiliated with the NFIP).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
62
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The parametric trigger is also utilized in catastrophe bonds or “cat bonds.” Such bonds
create risk-linked securities which transfer the risk of a specified event occurring—like a certain
category hurricane in a particular city—from an issuer or sponsor to investors. If the qualifying
event occurs, then the investors lose some or all of their principal and the issuer receives that
money to cover their anticipated losses.68 Catastrophe bonds with a parametric trigger may be a
more attractive alternative than a stand-alone parametric insurance policy as the cost of coverage
may be less as the insurance provider transfers the risks to capital markets.69 A community could
potentially sponsor a parametric cat bond designed to be triggered by a flood event likely to
substantially damage homes and the payouts could be used by those homeowners to achieve
compliance with floodplain regulations.
However, a community pursuing either a parametric insurance policy or cat bond must
have a solid understanding of the exact exposure that they seek to insure against. Parametric
insurance payouts are divorced from the actual cost of damage a community may suffer from a
disaster event.70 So there is “an inherent basis risk” that a community may suffer an event that
causes damage below the triggering threshold or the loss a community suffers might far exceed the
modeling used to develop the trigger.71

3.3.3 Equity Concerns
The National Flood Insurance Program faces a number of equity challenges. While disasters
do not themselves discriminate, a history of discriminatory policies like red-lining and segregation
as well as economic and social disparities have located low-income communities and communities
of color in highly vulnerable floodplains in certain states.72 Socially vulnerable communities were

Nathaniel Bullard, Blockchain Used as Settlement Mechanism for Cat Bond with Parametric Trigger, INSURANCE
JOURNAL 9 (Aug. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/6KJK-GT3Y. See also, Re.Bound Program, Leveraging Catastrophe
Bonds as a Mechanism for Resilient Infrastructure Project Finance (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/C6QN-8R5R.
69 Michael Edesess, Catastrophe Bonds: An Important New Financial Instrument, 4.3 ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT
ANALYST REVIEW 6 (2015), https://caia.org/aiar/1957.
70 Nigel Brook, et al., Parametric Insurance: Closing the Protection Gap 20 (2018), https://perma.cc/8FBA-G5P2.
71 Id.
72See e.g., Tanvi Misra, The Ugly Story of South Dallas, City Lab (May 11, 2016), available at
https://perma.cc/D2LE-323H; Marilyn C Montgomery and Jayajit Chakraborty, Assessing the Environmental
Justice Consequences of Flood Risk: a Case Study in Miami, Florida 2015 ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 10,
68
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some of those most heavily impacted by flooding after Hurricane Harvey. 73 These vulnerable
communities include the elderly, disabled, poor, and those who don’t own a car or cannot speak
English.
For several reasons, low-value homes are more likely to be assessed as substantially
damaged.74 First, an equivalent dollar value of damage (e.g. $55,000), would trigger the 50 percent
SI/SD threshold in a home worth $100,000, but not a home worth more than $110,000. Further, lowvalue homes may be more likely to be more significantly damaged due to location in vulnerable
areas, poor construction, or construction under outdated building codes.75 At least one study found
that officials were more likely to subjectively assess homes in low-income neighborhoods to be
substantially damaged than in high-income neighborhoods.76 Our proposed changes to the SI/SD
standards would likely increase the number of homes assessed as substantially damaged, making
it important to bundle these standards with other reforms to financially assist low-income and
vulnerable communities in bringing their homes into compliance with local floodplain regulations.
The disproportionate effect of flooding on vulnerable communities coupled with financing
challenges is a crucial concern to address in any proposed reform to the NFIP. In the case of SI/SD
standards, disproportionate impacts and opportunities for financial and other assistance must be
an integral part of a reform package. As noted earlier in this paper, existing ICC funds are unlikely
to provide sufficient support for households with fewer financial resources. FEMA has produced
an affordability framework with several strategies to provide subsidies to low-income families that
would be directly linked to reducing the cost of flood insurance premiums.77 Given the escalating

https://perma.cc/F3VG-P3N9. For some of the difficulties in analyzing these trends at the national level, see
NYU Furman Center, Population in the U.S. Floodplains: Data Brief (Dec. 2017), https://perma.cc/289CNHQ6.
73 Jeremy Deaton, Hurricane Harvey Hit Low-Income Communities Hardest, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/CM6B-ATAR.
74 Anne Siders, Social Justice Implications of U.S. Managed Retreat Buyout Programs, 2018 CLIMATIC CHANGE 119, https://perma.cc/X3LL-MG9W.
75 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Support Administration, Greater Impact: How Disasters Affect People of
Low Socioeconomic Status (July 2017), https://perma.cc/2KP2-74VK.
76 D. H. de Vries, J. C. Fraser, Citizenship Rights and Voluntary Decision Making in Post-Disaster U.S. Floodplain
Buyout Mitigation Programs, 30 INTERNATIONAL J. MASS EMERGENCIES DISASTERS 1–33 (2012),
https://perma.cc/PD98-DPGG.
77 FEMA, An Affordability Framework for the National Flood Insurance Program (April 17, 2018),
https://perma.cc/QK5R-Q4D9.
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risks of sea level rise and inland flooding, any of these subsidy programs would be best enhanced
if combined with mitigation assistance to reduce exposure to flooding.
However, lowering premiums will not address the high costs of elevating homes to make
them compliant with floodplain regulations. One solution may include working with communities
to create more transparent buyout programs that emphasize relocation and address issues of social
inequality directly. Under FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, substantial damage
assessments can trigger the option for a buyout. Community-supported relocation to lessvulnerable areas through an expedited, voluntary buyout process could be paired with the lower
SI/SD thresholds to provide an alternative option to rebuilding for low-value homeowners under
this program.

4. CONCLUSION
Reforming the SI/SD standard to calculate damages cumulatively over time and to be
triggered for damages and repair work worth less than 50 percent of the property can help the
NFIP program better weather a changing climate, lessen the taxpayer burden, and increase the
safety of millions of homeowners. Through model flood ordinances, building codes, other
regulations, and guidance, states have several mechanisms to encourage municipalities and
counties to adopt these more protective standards. Through adoption of higher SI/SD standards,
communities can reduce their residents’ flood risk, lower residents’ flood insurance premiums, and
enable residents to secure federal funds for rebuilding more resiliently after flood damage.
Challenges can be mitigated through: 1) issuing disclosure laws that track expenditures for repairs
and damages over time so that new owners are aware of their property’s history, 2) novel
financing and insurance strategies such as parametric insurance which reduce administrative
burden, and 3) integrating equity and underlying social vulnerability considerations into a reform
package that provides financing and supportive services for low-income and other vulnerable
communities.
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5. ANNEX
Communities receive their CRS classifications based upon the total credit they receive for
various floodplain management activities. There are 10 CRS classes. The CRS classes, required
points, and flood insurance premium discount are illustrated in the table below.

CRS Class
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
Class 5
Class 6
Class 7
Class 8
Class 9
Class 10

CRS Classes, Credit Points, and Premium Discounts78
Credit Points
Premium Reduction (in
SFHA)
4,500+
45%
4,000 – 4,499
40%
3,500 – 3,999
35%
3,000 – 3,499
30%
2,500 – 2,999
25 %
2,000 – 2,999
20%
1,500 – 1,999
15%
1,000 – 1,499
10%
500-999
5%
0-499
0%

The below tables illustrate the points available through the CRS program for more stringent
SI/SD standards. FEMA draft language for SI/SD standards earning points under the CRS program
are also included as examples.
CRS Points System for Cumulative Substantial Improvement/Damage Standards79
Requirement
Points
Cumulative Improvements
Improvements, modifications, and additions
45
to existing buildings are counted cumulatively
for at least ten (10) years
Improvements, modifications, and additions
25
to existing buildings are counted cumulatively
for at least five (5) years
Repairs for Cumulative Damage
Reconstruction and repairs to damaged
45

FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System Coordinator’s Manual, supra note 58 at
110-3.
79 FEMA, Substantial Improvement/Substantial Desk Reference, supra note 17 at 5-17 (2010) (also source for FEMA
draft text)
78
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buildings are counted cumulatively for at
least ten (10) years
Reconstruction and repairs to damaged
buildings are counted cumulatively for at
least five (5) years
Regulatory language that qualifies properties
for Increased Cost of Compliance insurance
coverage for repetitive losses.

25

20

Additions
Regulations that any addition to a building be
protected from damage from the base flood.
Total Points Available

20
110

FEMA Draft Language for a Cumulative Standard:
“Substantial improvement” means any combination of repairs, reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or
other improvement of a structure taking place during the life of the structure the cumulative cost of which
equals or exceeds fifty percent of the market value of the structure before the “start of construction” of the
improvement. This term includes structures that have incurred “substantial damage,” regardless of the
actual repair work performed. . . .”
CRS Points System for Lower Substantial Improvement/Damage Thresholds80
Requirement

Points

Regulatory Threshold for Substantial Damage to Entire Structure
Less than 10%
10% to 24%
25% to 39%
40% to 44%
45% to 49%

90
70
50
30
10

Other Regulatory Threshold Requirements
Threshold is no more than 25 percent of the bulk or square footage of the building’s
first floor.
* If the lower substantial improvements threshold applies to EITHER improvements,
modifications, and additions OR reconstruction and repairs, but not both, the value for
LSI is multiplied by 0.5.

20
N/A

FEMA, Substantial Improvement/Substantial Desk Reference, supra note 17 at 5-17 (2010) (also source for FEMA
draft text).
80
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FEMA Draft Language for a Lower Threshold Standard:
“A non-conforming building in a Flood Plain District may be altered, enlarged, or extended, on a one-timeonly basis, provided the cost of such alterations, enlargements, or extensions does not equal or exceed 40
percent of its pre-improvement market value, unless such building is permanently changed to a conforming
structure. Any non-conforming building in a Flood Plain District that is damaged by flood, fire, explosion,
Act of God, the public enemy or other cause may be restored to its original dimensions and conditions,
provided the cost of restoring the building to its before damage condition does not exceed 40 percent of its
pre-damage market value, excluding the value of the land.”
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